infoblox_threat_defense:dfp
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| infoblox_threat_defense:dfp [2025/11/08 11:30] – bstafford | infoblox_threat_defense:dfp [2025/11/12 15:28] (current) – [Add/Copy Source IP] bstafford | ||
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| DFP will maintain a management channel network session to BloxOne cloud. It will also maintain a separate DNS resolution channel (DNS-over-TLS on TCP-443). The management channel may be closed when not needed. DFP will try to keep the DNS resolution channel open but this isn't guaranteed. | DFP will maintain a management channel network session to BloxOne cloud. It will also maintain a separate DNS resolution channel (DNS-over-TLS on TCP-443). The management channel may be closed when not needed. DFP will try to keep the DNS resolution channel open but this isn't guaranteed. | ||
| - | NOTE: If you connect NIOS to CSP and enable DFP, if you then "reset all license" | + | NOTE: If you connect NIOS to CSP and enable DFP, if you then "reset all license" |
| ===== Local On-Prem Resolution ===== | ===== Local On-Prem Resolution ===== | ||
| Line 24: | Line 24: | ||
| If both Add and Copy are both ticked, Copy trumps add (i.e. if there is anything to copy, ' | If both Add and Copy are both ticked, Copy trumps add (i.e. if there is anything to copy, ' | ||
| + | |||
| + | NOTE: Consider enabling ADD only for the DNS server that clients query directly. This prevents a malicious user from spoofing the source IP by adding their own EDNS0 data. By having ADD only, Infoblox will wipe the EDNS0 data and add the true source IP. If you set COPY at the client facing resolver, then spoofed entries can make their way up to Threat Defense Cloud. You can then set COPY at the recursive caching layer that sits (if it exists) between the DNS servers that clients query and the Threat Defense cloud. | ||
| ===== DHCP/IPAM ===== | ===== DHCP/IPAM ===== | ||
| Line 87: | Line 89: | ||
| < | < | ||
| forwarders { 127.0.0.1 port 1024; };</ | forwarders { 127.0.0.1 port 1024; };</ | ||
| - | or (depending on whether | + | or (depending on whether |
| < | < | ||
| forwarders { 127.0.0.1 port 1024; };</ | forwarders { 127.0.0.1 port 1024; };</ | ||
| - | If, and only if, you have enabled '' | + | If, and only if, you have enabled '' |
| If the DFP on NIOS cannot access the four Threat Defense Anycast IP addresses, it will take about a minute to detect the failure. It will then remove the two lines of config (restoring original config if applicable; such as forwarding to 8.8.8.8) above from BIND and restart BIND to use local resolution configuration. During the BIND restart, DNS is also non-responsive. While BIND is being used locally for DNS, the DFP continues to monitor the Threat Defense Anycast IP addresses. When it determines that Threat Defense Anycast DNS is available once more, it will restart BIND to redirect queries to the cloud. The restart time on BIND will cause a DNS downtime for the network. This means that the failure> | If the DFP on NIOS cannot access the four Threat Defense Anycast IP addresses, it will take about a minute to detect the failure. It will then remove the two lines of config (restoring original config if applicable; such as forwarding to 8.8.8.8) above from BIND and restart BIND to use local resolution configuration. During the BIND restart, DNS is also non-responsive. While BIND is being used locally for DNS, the DFP continues to monitor the Threat Defense Anycast IP addresses. When it determines that Threat Defense Anycast DNS is available once more, it will restart BIND to redirect queries to the cloud. The restart time on BIND will cause a DNS downtime for the network. This means that the failure> | ||
| Line 131: | Line 133: | ||
| Note, if NIOS is using DFP (rather than " | Note, if NIOS is using DFP (rather than " | ||
| + | |||
| + | Assuming DFP is healthy: | ||
| + | |||
| + | NIOS | ||
| + | * DNSEC Disabled (no trust anchors). Fallback Disabled. - IP answer and no log in Portal. 630 msec to resolve | ||
| + | DNSEC Enabled (no trust anchors). Fallback Disabled. - SERVFAIL and also SERVFAIL log in Portal. 532 msec to resolve. Response cached locally for about 5 seconds. | ||
| + | * DNSEC Enabled (no trust anchors). Fallback Enabled. - IP answer and no log in Portal. 630 msec to resolve | ||
| + | * DNSEC Disabled (no trust anchors). Fallback Enabled. - IP answer and no log in Portal. 630 msec to resolve | ||
| + | |||
| + | |||
| + | NIOS-X (DFP+DNS) | ||
| + | Disable Signature Validation on DNS = You get IP and no log | ||
| + | Enabled Signature Validation on DNS and NO Trust Root Anchor = You get SERVFAIL and log generated | ||
| + | |||
| If a NIOS member is HA, make sure to add both nodes of the member to CSP and to enable a DFP service for BOTH nodes. If you don't, only the node with the DFP service can use DFP. If that node is becomes passive, then the active node will process DNS without DFP. WARNING: be sure to be careful when naming the host instances in the Infoblox Portal. Match the serial numbers to the actual NIOS serial numbers to make sure you don't mix up node A and node B as that just leads to confusion down the line. | If a NIOS member is HA, make sure to add both nodes of the member to CSP and to enable a DFP service for BOTH nodes. If you don't, only the node with the DFP service can use DFP. If that node is becomes passive, then the active node will process DNS without DFP. WARNING: be sure to be careful when naming the host instances in the Infoblox Portal. Match the serial numbers to the actual NIOS serial numbers to make sure you don't mix up node A and node B as that just leads to confusion down the line. | ||
infoblox_threat_defense/dfp.1762601415.txt.gz · Last modified: by bstafford
