infoblox_uddi:dhcp
Differences
This shows you the differences between two versions of the page.
| Next revision | Previous revision | ||
| infoblox_uddi:dhcp [2026/01/21 07:49] – created bstafford | infoblox_uddi:dhcp [2026/03/25 00:09] (current) – [Split Scope] bstafford | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
| - | ====== | + | ====== |
| If you set the DHCP servers at a subnet level, an '' | If you set the DHCP servers at a subnet level, an '' | ||
| - | DHCP Fingerprint : Fingerbank (Akamai) > Fing. | + | For Advanced Active/ |
| - | + | ||
| - | For Advanced Active/ | + | |
| ===== Performance ===== | ===== Performance ===== | ||
| Because in Active/ | Because in Active/ | ||
| Line 22: | Line 20: | ||
| ===== Split Brain ===== | ===== Split Brain ===== | ||
| If you have active/ | If you have active/ | ||
| + | ===== Rouge DHCP Servers ===== | ||
| + | DHCP protocol itself can’t solve rogue servers. ISC’s own guidance is [[https:// | ||
| + | |||
| + | Clients generally cannot distinguish an authorized DHCP server from an unauthorized one based solely on DHCP protocol behavior. As a result, there is essentially no remedy for this threat in the DHCP protocol. | ||
| + | |||
| + | So if your threat model is “someone plugs in a cheap router and it starts answering DHCP on an access port,” the real control is: | ||
| + | * DHCP snooping / trusted ports | ||
| + | * Port security / 802.1X / NAC | ||
| + | * VLAN segmentation / access controls | ||
| + | |||
| + | What Kea (not necessarily NIOS-X at this point in time) can do is to tighten control of “who gets served” | ||
| + | |||
| + | While Kea can’t prevent another server from responding to clients, it can help you enforce that Kea only serves the traffic you intend: | ||
| + | |||
| + | Kea supports DHCPv4 Option 82 (Relay Agent Information Option). | ||
| + | In many enterprise designs, you combine: | ||
| + | * Relays that insert Option 82, and | ||
| + | * Kea client classes that match on Option 82 values, | ||
| + | * plus DROP for anything that doesn’t match | ||
| + | |||
| + | That gives you “Kea only answers requests that come through my trusted relay/ | ||
| + | |||
| + | But it still does not stop a rogue DHCP server from answering those clients unless the switch blocks the rogue server’s offers. | ||
| + | |||
| + | ===== Starvation Attacks ===== | ||
| + | (For Kea, not NIOS-X yet) | ||
| + | |||
| + | for DHCP starvation and DECLINE loops, Kea’s best built-in mitigations are: | ||
| + | * Client classification + DROP (hard-block bad patterns) | ||
| + | * Limits hook (libdhcp_limits.so) for rate limiting and lease limiting (contain flood impact) | ||
| + | * Backlog guardrail (parked-packet-limit) to avoid getting swamped | ||
| + | |||
| + | Two key realities to keep in mind | ||
| + | * Rate limiting can’t stop pool exhaustion by many spoofed MACs by itself; it mainly protects server responsiveness and buys time. | ||
| + | * If you want the strongest starvation/ | ||
| + | |||
| + | |||
| + | A “good default” policy for exposed subnets (guest / access edge) | ||
| + | * Per-subnet rate limit (limits hook) to cap how much traffic can consume CPU. | ||
| + | * Per-class rate limit for “unknown/ | ||
| + | * Set a reasonable parked-packet-limit so floods don’t turn into runaway backlog. | ||
| + | |||
| + | ===== DNS Suffix ===== | ||
| + | * DHCP Option 15 – Domain Name | ||
| + | * Defines the client’s primary DNS domain name | ||
| + | * Historically used as the system’s default domain | ||
| + | * On many systems, it becomes: | ||
| + | * The device’s DNS suffix | ||
| + | * The first entry in the DNS search list (if no Option 119 is provided) | ||
| + | * | ||
| + | * DHCP Option 119 – Domain Search List | ||
| + | * Explicitly defines the DNS suffix search list | ||
| + | * Supports multiple domains | ||
| + | * If present, it typically overrides Option 15 for search list purposes | ||
| + | |||
| + | ===== Ping Before Offer ===== | ||
| + | |||
| + | * Ping Before Offer - applies across entire tenant and set in Global DHCP Configuration. | ||
| + | * Can configure timeout (default = 100ms) and number of pings (default = 1) | ||
| + | * e.g. 1000ms + 3 Ping = Client will not get Offer for 3 seconds. | ||
| + | * This does not impact the overall LPS capability of the machine as different leases are handled in parallel. | ||
| + | * Ping check information is only available in the logs at DEBUG level (i.e. does not get sent up to Infoblox Portal). Only INFO and above gets sent to Infoblox Portal. | ||
| + | * If DHCP server gets a ping response, Infoblox Portal marks the IP as ABANDONED. | ||
| + | |||
| + | ===== Split Scope ===== | ||
| + | * General use case for Split Scope is IPv6 and also Microsoft Migration. | ||
| + | * Infoblox manages DHCP on other vendors like Versa networks and which only support split scopes (or vendors like Microsoft which support split scope and can be managed by Universal DDI) - so Universal DDI must support Split Scopes. | ||
| + | * With IPv6 you can divide a /64 into two /65 subnets | ||
| + | * Split Scope has no lease sharing or heatbeat so it is simpler. | ||
| + | * DDNS Expirations can be an issue for Fixed Address objects in Split Ranges. | ||
| + | * Both servers in split scope will get any fixed address object in that range. | ||
| + | * You cannot adjust the split. It is always 50/50. Possibly off by 1. If Exclusion ranges block a large section of one half of the range, that server will only serve the bits it can. The system doesn' | ||
| + | * Don't convert split range to Active/ | ||
| + | * Resizing pool (e.g. 100-120) can also cause confusion because PartA doing 1-50 and PartB doing 51-100 is now PartA doing 1-60 and PartB doing 61 - 120 | ||
| + | * When you REPLACE a box, the new one will get the old leases from portal. | ||
| + | * If client got lease from ServerA and then ServerA fails, when client comes back for IP. If client has " | ||
| + | |||
infoblox_uddi/dhcp.1768981781.txt.gz · Last modified: by bstafford
