Table of Contents

NIOS-X DHCP

If you set the DHCP servers at a subnet level, an subsequent ranges you create in the subnet will allow you to just inherit the associated OPH. However, any existing ranges in the subnet will not allow any “use subnet OPH” option. For any existing ranges in the subnet, you will need to recreate them if you want them to inherit the subnets OPH assignment values.

For Advanced Active/Passive DHCP the lease DB is manged differently so it can be shared. It is shared via BloxOne CSP so the two DHCP servers don't have to talk to each other (although they do for heartbeats). Only ever do Kia Active/Passive if both devices are in the same VLAN. Because active has to stream updates immediately to passive (not Lazy Update). MS Delay between devices - Multiply by four and then how many of those you can fit into a second. That is how many LPS you can service in Active/Passive HA.

Performance

Because in Active/Passive the two nodes of NIOS-X need to sync with each other before issuing a lease, the latency between the two devices has a massive impact on how many leases the devices can issue per second.

(1000ms / latency_between_peers) = LPS

Notes

Split Brain

If you have active/passive and both servers are running but the communication link between them fails, DHCP “should” still function. Both servers will see the packets from the client, even if they can't talk to each other. They will know if the other is providing addresses. That said, there's likely to be conflicts BUT the client should do a RARP if the address is in use because one of the servers successfully issued a license.

Rouge DHCP Servers

DHCP protocol itself can’t solve rogue servers. ISC’s own guidance is here.

Clients generally cannot distinguish an authorized DHCP server from an unauthorized one based solely on DHCP protocol behavior. As a result, there is essentially no remedy for this threat in the DHCP protocol.

So if your threat model is “someone plugs in a cheap router and it starts answering DHCP on an access port,” the real control is:

What Kea (not necessarily NIOS-X at this point in time) can do is to tighten control of “who gets served”

While Kea can’t prevent another server from responding to clients, it can help you enforce that Kea only serves the traffic you intend:

Kea supports DHCPv4 Option 82 (Relay Agent Information Option). In many enterprise designs, you combine:

That gives you “Kea only answers requests that come through my trusted relay/switch insertion,” which helps prevent unauthorized clients/segments from successfully using your Kea server.

But it still does not stop a rogue DHCP server from answering those clients unless the switch blocks the rogue server’s offers.

Starvation Attacks

(For Kea, not NIOS-X yet)

for DHCP starvation and DECLINE loops, Kea’s best built-in mitigations are:

Two key realities to keep in mind

A “good default” policy for exposed subnets (guest / access edge)

DNS Suffix

Ping Before Offer

Split Scope